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Introduction
We are, again, asking what the First Amendment means, where its protections live, and who
should enforce them. As legal scholars have argued,  the First Amendment is not only a legal
doctrine or theory of jurisprudence but also a broader, o en invisible, cultural force with
looser constitutional groundings than many legal experts would prefer. The First
Amendment lives not only in courts and case law but also in “First Amendment institutions”
 —e.g., journalism, universities, libraries, churches, schools—that, collectively,
pragmatically, culturally, de ne free speech, its protections, and the interests it privileges or
harms. Understanding how these institutions see the First Amendment means searching for
o en hidden ways of thinking about speech that they share and debate. In this essay I
suggest that probability is one of these largely invisible logics that has serious consequences
for how we think about free speech and the First Amendment.
To understand when and why speech is created, chilled, censored, or celebrated, we can
look not only to unconstitutional regulations on speech but also to the social, cultural, and
technological forces that are “central to public discourse and its infrastructure.”  In arguing
for a more socially relevant “institutional First Amendment,” Schauer asks courts to think
about the power and particularities of institutions: “What distinguishes categories like
viewpoint discrimination, content regulation, public forum, and prior restraint from
categories like universities, libraries, elections, and the press is that the former exist in the
First Amendment but the latter exist in the world.”  Such institutions are not just “legal
subjects that depend on the courts to tell them what the law is,” they are places that
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“develop their own visions of what the First Amendment means, even if that vision is
di erent from the one courts would choose themselves.”
Today, the meaning and force of the First Amendment play out in the new and o en unstable
technological infrastructures  and institutional spaces of social media platforms. Variously
seen as media organizations, technology companies, public spheres, private realms, and
commercial spaces, these platforms solicit, moderate, circulate, interpret, and rank speech
of all kinds.  From Facebook and Google to Instagram and Twitter, they “host and organize
user content for public circulation, without having produced or commissioned it. They don’t
make the content, but they make important choices about that content: what they will
distribute and to whom, how they will connect users and broker their interactions, and what
they will refuse.”
Although scholars and practitioners alike hotly debate how and why to regulate such
platform speech and regularly call for new types of accountability, they are still largely
governed through self-initiated and self-designed policies, norms, and technological
infrastructures.  Platforms largely govern themselves. They encourage users to  ag o ensive
or harmful speech that break the community standards they write. They privately convene
and manage content moderators to monitor speech and apply company policies. And they
use proprietary machine-learning algorithmic systems to prevent some speech from ever
circulating in the  rst place.  Increasingly, though, such self-regulation is proving
insu cient. Scholars, activists, and technologists alike are trying to understand why
 agging, moderation, and machine learning only sometimes work; they are showing the
risks and limitations of relying exclusively on platform self-regulation and looking to social
justice and human rights movements for inspiration and models; they are lobbying publics
and lawmakers to force conversations about what government regulation or antitrust
breakups might look like; and they are questioning the very existence of such platforms,
suggesting that they are simply too fast and too big to be e ectively governed.  With
increasing urgency, people from myriad institutional contexts are seeing platform speech
regulation as inadequate and fundamentally at odds with the idea of collective self-
governance through free expression.
If we accept Horwitz’s and Schauer’s broad, institutional views of the First Amendment and
agree that platforms are key institutions where the First Amendment’s meaning and power
play out, then we need to understand how platforms understand free speech. More
speci cally, what logics drive their regulation of speech? What assumptions, judgments,
standards, de nitions, values, and practices underpin their understanding of speech, and
how closely do these logics align with normative ideals of what free speech could or should
be? I argue here that probability is one of these logics.
Before examining probability and speech platforms more closely, though, I want to connect
two bodies of work from outside the law to show how to see probability as a logic
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neo-institutional sociology and its core insight that organizational power is explained not
only by looking for logics within companies or professions but by examining the “loosely
coupled arrays of standardized elements”  that cut across institutions and tie them
together. Some forces work across organizational settings to make institutions seem stable,
predictable, teachable, and worthy of investment. For example, to understand medicine, we
should look at how medical schools, hospitals, insurance companies, and state regulators
make and remake the languages, routines, commodities, and expertise that make and
remake de nitions of illness, disease, and prevention.  Understanding “medicine” means
understanding the myriad “situated knowledges”  that make some types of prevention
taken for granted, some types of treatment controversial, and some types of expertise
debatable. Similarly, to understand museums, we should trace how ideas about curation,
preservation, funding, art, and professionalism emerge across the groups of artists,
philanthropists, and audiences that de ne art, debate its stakes, train its practitioners,
sustain its economics, and explain its value.  Scholars are similarly beginning to use these
theories to trace neo-institutional de nitions of journalism,  algorithms,  and press
freedom  —looking for logics and forces that both contest and stabilize  elds that live in no
one place.
The second body of relevant scholarship, Science and Technology Studies (STS), asks how
a liations, knowledge, expertise, and risk play out in technological cultures. One of its key
(and sometimes controversial) claims is that social life is understood not by measuring
impacts of technology on society—arti cially separating people and technology into causes
and e ects misses a fundamental point about how societies work—but, instead, by seeing
social life as the inextricable intertwining of materials, practices, relationships, and values
in infrastructures. The Facebook News Feed, for example, is not just a tool that ranks
content. It is a technology that combines Facebook’s business model, advertisers’ interests,
algorithmic signals, user actions, and myriad subcultures of speech, privacy, and social
association. To think that the News Feed has an “e ect” on its users is to mistakenly hold
both the News Feed and people static, missing the fact that they simultaneously re ect and
shape each other. STS scholars are concerned with what emerges from relationships between
and among humans and nonhumans. They see things like knowledge, expertise, society, and
risk emerging from the assumptions, outcomes, categories, stabilizations, aspirations,
resistances, and breakdowns that result when people and machines are tightly, inextricably
bound.
With these images of institutions and technologies we can return to the First Amendment
and ask a more precise question: What loosely coupled arrays of institutionally situated
sociotechnical elements govern online speech? Put di erently, which intersections of people
and machines de ne the conditions under which people express themselves, circulate
speech, encounter ideas, and su er abuse online? When and how do particular
sociotechnical intersections matter to free speech? Scholars of an institutional First
Amendment could look across the o en invisible institutional relationships and
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creating the First Amendment that publics need? If not, should we change the sociotechnical
logics, or should we revise our understanding of the First Amendment?
For the remainder of this essay, I want to show how these approaches might be used to
understand online speech platforms by focusing on one sociotechnical logic: probability.
Probabilistic ideas—about chance, likelihood, normalcy, deviance, con dence, thresholds—
underpin many of the sociotechnical infrastructures and institutions that regulate online
speech platforms. They are o en “baked in” to platforms, residing in complex and opaque
systems that are hard to see or understand. Further, probability o ers a kind of false stability
couched in mathematical certainty that is beyond the comprehension of most platform users
and regulators (and some makers) but that is routinely o ered to provide an illusion of
normalcy and predictability. Probability is a type of power that platform makers have a
vested interest in obfuscating, mystifying, and controlling.
Just as we understand medicine better by seeing disease as a contestable concept across
hospitals, schools, and patients, and just as we appreciate how art emerges from the
intertwined power of patronage, curation, and cra , we may better know what free speech
means online by critically interrogating probability—as an institutional and sociotechnical
phenomenon. If we can see the contingencies and contestations of platform probability, we
may not only discover it to be a largely invisible form of platform governance, but we may
also be able to make better interventions into platform cultures, saying more precisely why
certain forms of probability succeed or fail in their treatment of online speech.
De ining Probability
To know how probability fails or succeeds as an institutional technology, we need to
understand a bit about its history and varied meanings. The story of probability is the story
of how mathematics gains social power, how counting technologies become political
instruments, and how technologists of every era distribute risk and claim con dence at
increasingly large and complex social scales.
In their history of chance,  Gigerenzer et al. argue that the idea of probability came from the
need to formalize expectations, reduce risk, and make visible, veri able, and defensible
judgments about the future. As populations grew, commercial networks expanded and
human relationships strayed from face-to-face interactions into increasingly mediated
settings. People realized how complicated it was to build trust over distances, to decide
which strangers to trade with, and to know which risks were worth pursuing. As the usual
sources of authority (religion, philosophy, local community) were called into question or
became increasingly complex, people searched for other types of certainty. In uenced by
emerging legal doctrines about what human behaviors could reasonably be expected,
mathematicians developed a science of “probable knowledge” based on three sources of
authority: “physical symmetry” (e.g., coins had two sides and thus o ered 50/50 odds),
“observed frequencies of events” (e.g., weather incidents could be counted and aggregated
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into predictable climate patterns), and “degrees of subjective certainty or belief” (e.g., some
types of evidence were more or less reliable when trying a legal case or petitioning a judge).
 Gamblers, farmers, insurers, and lawyers, eager for systems of certainty, were all drawn to
the new science of prediction that stabilized environments, making it easier to know how to
act within them. Betting, planting, underwriting, and arguing could all move away from
superstition and luck. Instead, they could outsource their fears and concerns to probabilistic
technologies—dice, coins, frequency tables—that were backed by mathematical and
bureaucratic authority, regularly audited, and cared for by trustworthy statisticians.
These systems of probability, though, were limited by their reliance on observed frequencies.
They were fundamentally descriptive and only worked within speci c stable scenarios. They
had little to say about how to make the world be more predictable or how to understand
what happened when di erent conditions intertwined and outcomes were not always easily
observable. These limitations laid the groundwork for two innovations in probability: control
and conditionality. Though a discussion of these forces may seem to take us away from a
focus on free speech, they are arguably at the heart of how platforms understand and
regulate mass-scale online expression.
Control
To enable control through probability, new and powerful mass-scale counting practices,
technologies, and values began to emerge. Surveys, censuses, standardized observations,
philosophies of positivism, and behavioral categories all showed how probability could do
more than simply standardize expectations about the world. Probability could show which
parts of the world were unpredictable and needed to be controlled. The discovery of standard
distributions of behaviors meant that people were “normal if they conform[ed] to the central
tendency of such laws, while those at the extremes [were] pathological.”  Techniques of
probability could say with certainty exactly how common or rare an extreme was and how its
variance appeared across a population. If those extremes could be tied to people and
behaviors, then they could justi ably be surveilled for deviance, punished for straying too
far from expectations, and held up as examples of how deviances harm collectives.
Individuals—who were too unpredictable and idiosyncratic for statistical certainty—were
reshaped into groups that behaved predictably and rationally so that a new “science of social
physics” could produce l’homme moyen—the average man—an entity that voted, purchased,
moved, lived, and died in ways that could be seen, aggregated, and shaped. These
observations, categories, and databases made societies not just observable but governable.
Probability became a technology for “making up people.”
But hints of resistance emerged to claim that people are not the same everywhere. In their
history of nineteenth-century probability, Gigerenzer et al. describe how systems of
probability in England, France, and Germany represented di erent human values.  English
statisticians defended the idea of free will and cautioned against ascribing patterns to






8/3/2020 Probably Speech, Maybe Free: Toward a Probabilistic Understanding of Online Expression and Platform Governance | Knight First Amendment Institute
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/probably-speech-maybe-free-toward-a-probabilistic-understanding-of-online-expression-and-platform-governance 6/20
frequencies rather than as quanti cation of uncertainty in a particular case.”  French
statisticians and o cials were similarly cautious about probability becoming a tool for
controlling individuals but invested heavily in state statistical bureaucracies focused on the
idea that understanding the probable behavior of l’homme moyen was the key to making
good public policy. People may have free will, but probability could still be an e cient and
responsible way to see patterns of autonomy and allocated public resources.  German
statisticians were the most skeptical of probability’s damage to free will. To the Germans, the
“idea that society could be typi ed by an average man simply re ected an impoverished
conception of the human community.” The job of the German statistician was to “break a
population up into its various parts . . . in order to learn something about causes” and their
varied sources.
Similarly, in his study of how “socialist statistics” in the USSR, India, and China emerged as
academic  elds, bureaucratic practices, and a symbol of self-knowledge and “hallmark of a
modern nation-state,” Ghosh  nds that that the very idea of a “social fact” depends on the
type of society you think probability serves.  In contrast to Western traditions that saw
statistics as a mathematical science for reducing societal randomness through random
sampling, regressions, and probability theory, Marxist (Soviet-Chinese) statistics saw itself
as a social science that rejected the idea of randomness or chance. Instead, it stressed the
importance of completely counting everything that could be counted, preparing regular and
exhaustive reports of populations, and creating sampling demographics and contexts that
could be defended as “typical.”  If Western statisticians tried to construct the average
person and predict her behavior,  Marxist mathematicians aimed to capture entire societies
and explain their movements.
Conditionality
Motivated by a desire to study not just patterns but also their variance, some statisticians
recast the  eld as a way of understanding the conditions that in uence outcomes. Broadly
grouped under the umbrella of Bayesian statistics, the key insight is that models of
probability need ways to incorporate new evidence—to learn about the world and change in
response to it. If “frequentists” are concerned with the chance of X happening, “Bayesians”
try to understand the chance of X happening if Y or Z has also happened—or might happen.
It means that Bayesians are not content simply to predict the world as it is; they are more
speculative and experimental, eager to understand the set of possible outcomes if we had
evidence about other outcomes. Rather than asking “is someone 20 versus 40 years old more
likely to commit a crime?”—a frequentist would count instances and arrive at an answer—a
Bayesian reframe the question as “under what conditions is someone 20 versus 40 years old
more likely to commit a crime?” This puts conditions into play and raises questions about
which conditions might matter and why: Does a previous conviction matter? Does gender
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Bayesians are building models of the world by observing how the world behaves under
conditions, but such models should make us ask where these conditions come from, which
conditions are okay to ask about, and which conditions are unacceptable bases for
governing social systems. Those conditions can come from existing datasets that describe
the world, experimenters’ folk theories, and simulations that imagine complex realities that
do not actually exist—if Y were to happen with frequency f, how con dently could we predict
the likelihood of Z? With enough data, no hypothesis is untestable, no string of
contingencies unexaminable.
This Bayesian approach maps well to the “big data” made possible by omnipresent
surveillance technologies and cheap information storage as well as the computational
experimentation enabled by machine learning techniques and multivariate analysis. Instead
of cra ing particular experiments—motivated by theory to create or sample conditions under
which beliefs may be true with some degree of probability  —today’s Bayesians can use
massive data sets and computational power to ask which conditional beliefs meet acceptable
thresholds. Bayesian models can probably  nd enough evidence to support any set of
conditions and beliefs. Machine learning statisticians can set belief thresholds and ask:
Under which conditions are these belief thresholds met? Instead of asking how likely is X if Y
or Z happen, they can ask: Since we have enough data on X, Y, or Z happening (with new
data arriving constantly), what is the complete set of beliefs that meet a particular threshold
in any given moment? Given a dataset of instances, what are all the things I can believe,
now, if I want a con dence level of 95 percent? 80 percent? 70 percent? And what could I
believe in the future, knowing that new data are constantly arriving?
* * *
While a complete history of the idea of probability is beyond the scope of this essay, what
begins to emerge is a complex landscape of what probability could mean and an image of
how these di erent meanings represent political choices and technological power.
Does probability live in natural systems that have inherent likelihoods—like coins, dice, or
the weather? Is probability about observing frequencies of events and building models of as
many outcomes as can be imagined and seen? Is probability a control technology, a way of
knowing what is likely, normal, deviant, or expected in order to decide how to invest
governance and which categories to reward? Is probability actually about sustaining beliefs
under particular conditions? To hold a particular belief, what else do we need to know, and
how con dently do we need to know it? Or, in an age of large-scale data and near-
instantaneous computation, is the very idea of probability an anachronism—a holdover from
a time when we could not count completely, were forced to  nd ways to “tame chance,”
and could not yet implement Marxist ideals of complete enumeration for control of entire
populations?
Platform Probabilities and Speech
³ 
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It may seem as if I have strayed signi cantly from my focus on First Amendment institutions,
free speech, and platform governance. My claim, though, is that if we can see platforms
asprobabilistic constructions, we might better recognize and redirect the probabilistic logics
they use to govern expression and control populations. We never step into the same Google
Search or Facebook News Feed twice because the companies that make them are constantly
changing their ranking and recommendation algorithms, continually A/B testing new
interfaces and options on population samples, and updating the behavioral models they use
to convince advertisers that they can reliably reach particular markets.  Most
fundamentally, platforms are probabilities because there is only a chance of them existing in
any particular form at any given moment.
Platform content moderation is also probabilistic. It is a con uence of likelihoods: did an
algorithmic  lter trigger a computational threshold to block o ensive content, did enough
users within a particular period of time  ag a su cient amount of content to cause an
account to be suspended, and did third-party content moderators evenly apply platforms’
content standards? Many users simply do not know how their content is being moderated,
much less the shi ing statistical ground on which such judgments stand. As Facebook’s
Monika Bickert acknowledges, “A company that reviews a hundred thousand pieces of
content per day and maintains a 99 percent accuracy rate may still have up to a thousand
errors.”
Even the news headlines, ledes, and advertisements we read are probabilistic—the result of
constant, invisible A/B testing as publishers learn which words and images drive tra c and
attract demographics. Depending on how con dently platforms can detect them and how
interested they are in banishing them, some platform speech—e.g., approximately two thirds
of tweeted links  —comes from automated bots and fake accounts designed to  ood online
spaces and create the impression that a viewpoint might be true because it is expressed so
frequently.
Similarly, mis- and disinformation are probabilistic phenomena, as makers and detectors of
“deep fake” media play continual cat-and-mouse games to create and catch fabricated
images, audio, and videos.  When Facebook partnered with news and fact-checking
organizations to remove such content from its platform, it did not delete such content from
its site; rather, it celebrated its statistical ability to “rank those stories signi cantly lower”
and “cut future views by more than 80%.”  A er criticism that it spreads conspiracy videos,
YouTube announced that it would “begin reducing recommendations of borderline content
and content that could misinform users in harmful ways.”  The move only impacts
“recommendations of what videos to watch, not whether a video is available on YouTube.”
To be clear, Facebook and YouTube do not say they are unsure whether content is false or
conspiratorial; they use private partnerships and proprietary algorithms to categorize
speech, label such categories with certainty, and then use probability to strike balance they
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Financial markets, too, re ect probabilistic speech systems. Thomson Reuters and Dow
Jones have created systems to parse economic news stories, decide how con dently they
understand the story’s meaning, and then drive nearly instantaneous algorithmic trading
decisions based on which con dence measures have been met. Even the creators of
computational systems that autonomously produce speech have publicly warned that
automatically generated news stories pose signi cant risks to public discourse because they
 nd that readers are too quick to trust algorithmically produced speech; they underestimate
the likelihood of encountering algorithmically generated text and overestimate their ability
to distinguish them from human-written stories.
We only ever have a chance of encountering speech as others do right now, or as we did days
or even minutes ago. Our experiences with online speech are the product of loosely coupled
arrays of sociotechnical systems: people, algorithms, commodi cations, thresholds,
con dences, intentions. At any given moment, this array drives the probabilities that speech
appears, circulates, is believed, has monetary value, and drives action.
To unpack this further, consider three domains in which probability governs speech: the
chance that content is banned, platforms’ relationships to the risk pro les of professions,
and the extent to which technology companies de ect responsibility for probabilistic
outcomes to technical infrastructures and third-party designers.
Probably Banned
First, the idea of a speech “ban” makes little sense in probabilistic online environments.
Platforms only ever make it more or less likely that speech circulates; they never guarantee
the distribution or disappearance of speech.  This likelihood depends on a mix of factors
determining how content is: created by a blocked, muted, or hidden user;  agged by users;
caught by moderators; understood by translators; classi ed by humans interpreting
community standards; sensed by machine learning algorithms; judged similar to previously
blocked content; and highlighted by mainstream media outlets.
In practice, whole languages and regions are never susceptible to such bans because they
are not being algorithmically monitored. Though Facebook o ers its interface in 111
languages, its algorithms can detect hate speech in just 30 languages and “terrorist
propaganda” in 19 languages. Its director of public policy for Africa said that “a lot of people
don’t even know that there are community standards”—and thus fail to  ag speech.  No
platform has translated its standards and algorithmic tools into all of the languages its
interface supports. Such bans are probabilistic—never binary—and only applicable in
languages and regions that are monitored.
For example, a er reports that the 2017 London Bridge attackers were radicalized, in part,
through extremist YouTube videos, parent company Google said that videos it de ned as
o ensive but not in breach of its community guidelines would carry warnings, not be
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Counsel Ken Walker said, was to make these videos “have less engagement and be harder to
 nd.” Additionally, although he said that Google’s “Trusted Flagger reports are accurate over
90 per cent of the time,” the program would be expanded to include an additional 50
organizations to be trusted  aggers.  The additional  aggers would presumably increase the
90 percent  gure to an even more acceptable number. Here, calculation represents
trustworthiness: mistakes had been happening 10 percent of the time, but the attacks made
that old number unacceptable. It had to decrease by some amount.
In internal discussions about whether to ban Alex Jones from its Instagram platform,
Facebook used similarly actuarial thinking to defend its initial inaction. The company’s
“risk-and-response team” found that Jones’s account failed to meet its violation threshold:
“an IG [Instagram] account has to have at least 30% of content violating at a given point in
time as per our regular guidelines.”  Note the snapshot nature of this threshold: at least
30% violating content at a given point in time, not 30% over the account’s lifetime. The harm
threshold is calculated instantaneously, not cumulatively, and stays the same regardless of
context. A U.S.-based Facebook executive went on to say that even the comments on Jones’s
account were under an unspoken threshold of acceptability: “The 560 comments have been
reviewed. Only 23 [4%] are violating and therefore the object does not meet the threshold for
deletion.”
Whereas YouTube’s 90 percent  gure was meant to reassure users that its mistakes were rare
across its platform—90 percent was good and not as bad as 80 percent, but still not good
enough to stave o  calls for reform—Facebook’s numbers (30% of violating content, 4% of
comments) were seemingly commonsense evidence that only a small part of a single account
was o ensive, not yet o ensive enough to warrant action.
Percentages, anthropologist Jane Guyer argues, “are better seen as performatives, aimed to
call forth a judgmental response about ‘the way things are going’: it’s getting too much; it’s
not fair anymore; it’s reaching a danger zone.”  These judgmental responses are, of course,
contingent (when is too much too much?) and contextual (who is 90% certainty or 30%
violations good enough for?). In online contexts where bans are impossible—Facebook’s
head of arti cial intelligence admits “it’s never going to go to zero”  —it seems past time to
debate normative questions about who has the power to de ne bans as probably “good
enough” and for whom.
Professional Alignment
Probability also can be a way to earn legitimacy by aligning with professions that are already
socially accepted as imperfect. Such partnerships can be a way of sharing risk,
communicating a system’s imperfection, and managing users’ expectations.
For example, in 2017 Facebook began deploying “suicide prevention tools that use arti cial
intelligence to identify posts with language expressing suicidal thoughts.”  It developed
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that include keywords or phrases indicating thoughts of self-harm.”  Putting aside legal
concerns about such systems operating outside of “HIPPA privacy regulations, principles of
medical ethics, or rules governing research on human subjects,” the system’s success rests
upon several types of probability.
Relying on medical practitioners’ statistical models of how words and phrases correlate with
suicidal thoughts and actions, the system translates those probabilities into an algorithmic
detector. Probabilities from one domain (clinical evidence) are imported into another (social
media posts). Posts are parsed, classi ed, and correlated with suicide indicators; if certain
thresholds are triggered, the system alerts emergency responders, who perform “wellness
checks” on the possibly suicidal people.
To be successful, the system has to reliably transfer and translate probabilities from one
context to another; social media environments have to look enough like clinical settings that
each other’s watchwords can be compared con dently enough to trigger action. Designers
and clinicians also have to consider the potential e ects of such wellness check systems and
their popularity: Will knowing that social media environments are being monitored for
suicidal language make at-risk individuals more or less likely to express themselves in such
places? If human observers know that such a system is in place, will it make them more or
less likely to intervene when they see potentially suicidal language, or will they trust that an
algorithm driven by clinically reliable patterns is making a better judgment than they would?
And consider the system’s tolerance of false positives and false negatives. If the system errs
and sees a suicide risk where none exists, or where the risk does not need a standardized
wellness check, will suicide-related speech travel elsewhere and stand a reduced chance of
being detected when a wellness check might be appropriate? Or, if Facebook claims to be on
guard for suicide-related language and then fails to see genuinely suicide-related risks, has it
created false comfort and unreliable expectations for suicide victims and their potential
support networks?
To be sure, no system—human or computational—for recognizing suicide is error-free, but
this system rests on new types of probabilistic assumptions: that suicidal language in social
media platforms means the same things as in other settings; that algorithms can con dently
parse subtle language, humor, sarcasm, code switching, and complex social contexts; that
people share expectations about what the system is, what it is capable of, and how it
compares to human judgment; and that the system’s failures and risks of false positives and
negatives have been fully anticipated and understood. As with the previous example in
which the Facebook AI head acknowledged the impossibility of completely banning content,
Facebook similarly issues caveats regarding the riskiness of this system by saying that “we’re
not doctors, and we’re not trying to make a mental health diagnosis.”
Infrastructured Probability
Finally, probability can be a way to de ect responsibility for the con guration of technical
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Civil Liberties Union found that the technology falsely—but con dently—matched the
images of 28 members of the United States Congress with people who had previously been
arrested for committing crimes.  In its defense of the technology, Amazon did not claim that
the tool had erred; rather, it said that the ACLU had failed to apply the proper con dence
threshold:
"While 80% con dence is an acceptable threshold for photos of hot dogs, chairs,
animals, or other social media use cases, it wouldn’t be appropriate for
identifying individuals with a reasonable level of certainty,” the [Amazon]
spokesperson said. “When using facial recognition for law enforcement activities,
we guide customers to set a higher threshold of at least 95% or higher."
In response, the ACLU noted that the tool’s default “similarity threshold parameter” is set to
recognize faces that are considered 80 percent similar, a default that Amazon’s technical
documentation says can be changed.  In this example, probability is cast as an institution’s
technical responsibility. The ACLU critiques Amazon for creating a tool with an unacceptably
low default con dence threshold and not contractually requiring that di erent thresholds be
used in particular contexts. In making it possible for law enforcement o cials to license the
system and use any standards of certainty they wish, Amazon adopts a standard “buyer
beware”defense, suggesting that its technology is just a neutral tool and that it is up to
clients set the appropriate con dence threshold. To the ACLU, probability is the system’s
linchpin of certainty where the power of prediction plays out; to Amazon, probability is just
another option for its customers to set as they like. Responsibility and accountability plays
out in the interpretation of probability.
Further examples abound, but what we can see across all of these examples is how
probability is simultaneously an institutional achievement (multiple actors convene to debate
what probability means and what thresholds of risk, error, or con dence are acceptable), a
sociotechnical construct (probabilities live in algorithmic sensors, large scale datasets,
approaches to machine learning), and a normative defense (mistakes will be made,
technologists are not clinicians, clients know best). Probability is, at once, a seemingly
neutral technique, evidence of power, and a rationalization of risk.
As both its histories and contemporary applications show, probability does not mean any
one thing. It can be evidence of expectations about the world and observations of seemingly
natural frequencies. It can reveal attempts to control the world through categories used to
de ne normality and punish deviance. And it can mean experimenting on the world,
discovering the conditions under which certain people—and machines—can con dently hold
expectations about patterns and outcomes.
These di erences emerge as statisticians debate their techniques and grapple with how the
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images of how to govern people, what a “reasonable” person can expect in likely scenarios,
and what it means to administer justice when cases sit between the patterned and the
particular. And probability appears in the tacit knowledge and work practices of
technological cultures that make, test, and deploy statistical systems. As technologists
anticipate, simulate, and normalize error, they calculate systems to be “good enough” to
deploy into the wild. Deploying a technology also means releasing bene t and risk into the
world—enrolling people in failures you know will probably happen, forcing them to live your
probabilistic calculations, and relying upon them to report or in some way re ect your
errors. Such an intertwining of risk and probability is not new. As Dryer shows in her
insightful history of probability’s role in the politics and design of algorithmic systems of the
1920s onward, probability has always encoded—in practices, artifacts, values—human
desires for certainty, control, and objectively defensible risk conclusions.  Probabilities are
not just mathematical constructs or even a social constructions; they are diagnostics of the
errors that people and societies are willing, able, or forced to endure. Probability lets us ask
precise questions about how consequences are imagined, hoped for, endured, and resisted.
It is about making public life.
Probability and Free Speech
Probability matters to free speech and free speech platforms precisely because the
probabilities governing communication environments shape our collective ability to see and
understand unavoidably shared collective outcomes—to discover ourselves as publics and
know our chances of self-governance.
If we take seriously the idea that the First Amendment as currently conceived runs the risk of
becoming irrelevant  and accept that we need a more expansive vision of the First
Amendment as an institutional phenomenon, then we need to know all of the ways that
speech is elicited, chilled, and celebrated. Probability is one of those ways. Through their
designs, business models, and moderation policies, platforms are constantly making
probabilistic, actuarial calculations with the power to shape collective self-governance.
Scholars and practitioners alike are only just beginning to understand how platforms’
sociotechnical dynamics reveal dramatically uneven distributions of probability. Although
probabilistic errors may be modeled and represented as collective, shared consequences,
they are experienced by particular populations and individual people. How are probabilities
distributed? When Facebook says that its fact-checking infrastructure catches 80 percent of
falsities on the platform, who endures the harms of the other 20 percent? Or when it says
that Alex Jones’s Instagram account isn’t o ensive enough to sanction, who endures the
unsanctioned hate? When Google says that its  aggers are over 90 percent accurate, who
lives with the 10 percent error? When Facebook’s suicide detection engineers acknowledge
that “there will be mistakes,” how do we translate this defense into a more active voice—it is
not that “mistakes will be made,” it is Facebook making mistakes—and hold them
accountable? Indeed, what is the right unit to hold accountable? An individual mental
  
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health practitioner who repeatedly made mistakes would be sanctioned di erently from a
clinic that erred frequently, and di erently again from an entire profession that failed
predictably. Where exactly is probability and error—and the accountability thereof—in
speech systems that intertwine users, designers, algorithms, regulators, and venture
capitalists?
We might also consider how di erent geographic and cultural meanings of probability play
out in speech systems. As discussed, di erent statistical ideologies and practices have
appeared, in various ways, in France, England, Germany, India, China, the United States,
and the USSR. To what extent do these variations re ect di erent cultural understandings of
statistics, of the types of surveillance and data gathering required to observe and predict
behavior, and of the types of error and con dence statistical systems are culturally thought
to have? If statistics is not only a mathematical technique but also a social fact, should the
machine learning systems designed to monitor and govern platform speech be designed
di erently before being deployed in particular regions, cultures, or languages? Platforms
already fail to provide machine translation tools for all the languages they support, but
should the underlying logics and values of those tools di er?
It may seem esoteric, but the quest for certainty may be harming the planet. Curious about
the environmental costs of arti cial intelligence, computer scientist Emma Strubell and her
colleagues studied the carbon footprint of natural language processing (NLP) technologies,
like those that have been used to write compelling “fake news” articles.  To be reliable
enough for peer-review publications and enterprise-level technologies, such technologies
require vast amounts of algorithmic training and computing power, quickly becoming
energy-intensive processes with signi cant environmental consequences. They found that
training such a model “can emit more than 626,000 pounds of carbon dioxide equivalent—
nearly  ve times the lifetime emissions of the average American car (and that includes
manufacture of the car itself).”  Models with lower degrees of con dence had smaller
carbon footprints. If we want to create and detect manufactured speech with the scale,
speed, and certainty that platforms demand, we will harm the Earth. How do we want to
allocate speech certainty, given its ecological impact?
Finally, probability matters to free speech because it goes to the heart of what it means to
realize and govern ourselves. If, as Hacking argues, “statistics has consequences for the
ways in which we conceive of others and think of our own possibilities and potentialities,”
then probability is a key logic of humanity.  If the chance that our words spread or that we
hear others depends on probabilistic systems, then we have a vested interest in seeing
probability as a political technology that either helps or hinders our abilities to think,
associate, deviate, adapt, resist, or act. And when we limit probability to one type of
concept, one particular operationalization or set of values, we limit our ability to imagine
new social arrangements. If a group is inchoate, under attack, or actively marginalized
—“enclave publics” who need special protections—should those groups be treated di erently
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Google’s errors. Should people with a large number of followers or subscribers automatically
have to statistically demonstrate that they are less likely to disseminate harmful speech,
because they are closer to traditional broadcasters? (How many followers, what would the
statistical test be, and who would make these decisions?) Should data journalists use
di erent levels of statistical certainty depending on the public importance of a story and the
potential impacts of their  ndings on particular policies and populations?  Di erent
theories of the public demand di erent understandings of probability.
Conclusion
Online speech systems exist at a scale that makes human oversight practically impossible.
Their scale forces them into “operating actuarially” and using probability to manage that
scale.  Currently, probability is most o en the instrument of those who have vested interests
in maintaining large-scale surveillance economies. Scale makes money, and probability
enables scale.
But we should not fear probability, reject it outright as a tool of oppression or control, or
relegate it to the narrow domain of statisticians and technologists. Rather, we should
interrogate speech systems as probabilities that beg new questions. Are these the meanings
and applications of probability we need? Who has enough knowledge to con dently predict
these systems’ behaviors, and how can the private and proprietary nature of probabilistic
knowledge be challenged? Who su ers from false positives and false negatives? Which
interests and beliefs are embedded in the Bayesian classi ers that categorize online speech?
 Which types of errors are known and tolerated, how is risk distributed, and who has the
institutional standing or technological power to challenge thresholds, reject error rates, and
renegotiate categories? Should platforms be held accountable not just for errors but error
rates and con dence thresholds? Should we issue “probability taxes” on those who
distribute risk in socially unacceptable ways?
To think anew about probability and the role it plays in speech governance, we need to think
anew about the “permanently beta” culture that seems to require failure as a marker of
success, encouraging innovators to set error thresholds too low, to move too fast and break
too many things.
But not all errors are alike, and they can compound with disastrous consequences. In her
study of the Challenger explosion, sociologist Diane Vaughan describes how NASA made
“routine decisions” that “normalized technical deviation” so successfully and invisibly that
it was blind to the catastrophic failure their ritualized acceptance of increasingly
compounded risks caused.  Where in platforms—in their construction, use, and governance
—are there understandings of normalized deviance, compound risk, and catastrophic
failure? Are platform errors always simply actuarial inevitabilities, or are there some that are
so morally unacceptable they might be existential challenges to platforms, their
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We are only beginning to understand how and why to regulate speech platforms. Probability
should be a central part of this conversation.
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